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Congress, being a political institution, boasts of its ac-
complishments and hides its embarrassments. For anyone familiar
with the United States transfer tax system, the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax Act of 19801 contains a significant embarrassment but,
as this Article shall argue, not necessarily a permanent one in the
effort to reform the taxation of wealth. The Act reverses, except
for certain eligible estates which elect to have whatever benefit
may accrue from its coverage, Congress's decision in 1976 to ex-
pand the rule of carryover basis to cover property transmitted at
death. 2  Instead, the tax system-and in this regard the focus is
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1974, Yale. The
author wishes to thank but in no way implicate Professor Alan L. Feld of Boston University
School of Law for help in teaching and thinking about taxation.
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Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229.
2 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 expanded carryover basis to include dispositions at
death. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1872 (1976). Section 2005(a)(1) retained the old
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actually the income tax system-will have two separate rules. If
an individual receives a gift as a result of a lifetime transfer, he
will take the gifted property at the donor's cost basis, adjusted for
any gift tax paid by the donor on the net unrealized appreciation
in the gift under Internal Revenue Code section 1015. 3  If an
individual receives property in a transfer occurring at or as a re-
sult of the death of the owner, then the cost basis to the recipient
"steps-up" or "steps-down" (from the donor's cost basis) to its
value on the valuation date. 4
THE INCOME TAX CONTEXT
In reading the preceding paragraph the reader will note an
unanalyzed and perhaps troubling switch from a focus on the re-
peal of carryover basis at death, as it was contained in section
1023, in the transfer tax context to a focus on its actual place in
the income tax. An analysis of this dual role of unrealized ap-
preciation in a decedent's property explains in part why carryover
basis was repealed. Although it will be argued later that Congress
step-up/step-down rule of I.R.C. § 1014 in the case of a decedent dying before January 1,
1977. The Revenue Act of 1978 delayed the effective date of I.R.C. § 1023, and the non-
application date of I.R.C. § 1014, to estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1979,
and before January 1, 1980, respectively. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515,
92 Stat. 2884. The Senate Committee Report attributed the delay to I.R.C. § 1023's com-
plexity and the need to give Congress a chance to reconsider the matter. See SEN. REP. No.
1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 213-14, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6761,
6976-77. The repeal by Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229 (1980) permits certain
estates to retain coverage of I.R.C. § 1023.
3 Prior to the 1976 Act the donor's basis in the gift was increased to reflect the full
amount of any gift tax paid. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005(c), 90 Stat. 1877 (1976) added
I.R.C. § 1015(d) as part of the adoption of carryover basis and was not repealed. This
section increases the donor's basis only in the amount of gift tax paid on the net unrealized
appreciation in the gifted property. The Report of the House Committee on Ways and
Means on the 1976 change labelled the old law as "too generous in that it permits the basis
of the gift property to be increased by the full amount of the gift tax paid .. ." H.R. REP.
No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3356, 3398. The adjustment was described as excessive and necessary only to avoid the evil
of a tax (income tax) on wealth already taxed by the gift tax. This evil existed, if at all, only
with respect to the appreciation. The adjustment, however, is not absolute. If the fair mar-
ket value of the property at the time of gift is less than the donor's basis the Code makes
no adjustment and the donee receives, for gain purposes, only the donor's unadjusted
basis. For loss purposes the donee's basis is the fair market value at the time of gift. A
subsequent sale at a price between these two guideposts generates neither gain nor loss.
I.R.C. § 1015(a).
4 I.R.C. § 1014 ties valuation to the date of death or the alternative estate tax valua-
tion date, if elected by the executor. IR.C. § 2032. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1 (1978).
appears to have decided that unrealized appreciation of property
passed at death should for the time being be taxed only in the
transfer tax system, an explanation of its position in the income
tax is important in understanding what Congress should do in
light of the repeal of section 1023.
Carryover basis and stepped-up basis are choices available in
designing an income tax. The rule which establishes the need to
make this choice is that gifts and bequests, unlike other so-called
windfalls, are not taxable income. 5 Section 102, which excludes
the receipt of such items from the concept of income, prevents
the United States income tax system fiom having a "comprehen-
sive tax base." 6 Section 102 appears to have wide support and no
serious attempts have been made in recent years to alter it.7 This
is particularly noteworthy in view of the wide discussion and ap-
parently broad support for a more comprehensive tax base among
prominent lawyers 8 and economists.9
The exclusion of gratuitous transfers from income and rec-
ognition is a fundamental policy of the income tax necessary to
place the carryover basis/stepped-up basis in context. Another
such policy, embodied at various points in the Code, is that a
transfer which does not constitute a recognition event shall not
result in any significant adjustment to the basis of the property
received. Thus, the recipient of an inter-vivos gift takes it at the
donor's basis, with an adjustment for any gift tax paid on the por-
tion of the value of the gifted property which is net unrealized
appreciation. 10 The recipient of stock in a non-taxable corporate
reorganization takes the new stock, assuming no boot is received,
at the same basis he had in the old stock he surrendered.11 The
5 I.R.C. § 102. The exclusion of gifts from income has been a feature of the income
tax system since 1913. J. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 40 (1973).
6 For the leading article on the comprehensive tax base, see Bittker, A Comprehensive
Tax Base As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967).
7 B. BITFKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 933 (4th ed.
1972).
8 Although the American Bar Foundation's study on tax reform endorsed the com-
prehensive Haig-Simons definition of income, it intentionally and without explanation
exempted gifts and bequests from its two proposed concepts of income, labelled BTBi and
BTB2. Galvin, History of the Substantive Tax Reform Project, STUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE TAX
REFORM 9 (A. Willis ed. 1969). Apparently Professor Surrey has not decided whether the
exclusion of gratuitous transfers is a tax expenditure or merely defines the concept of
income. S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 28-29, 286 n.6 (1973).
9 See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938).
10 See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
', I.R.C. §§ 307, 358, 1016(b).
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owner of a home who sells it and reinvests the proceeds in a simi-
larly priced new home within eighteen months takes the new
home at the same basis he had in the old home, even though he
may have realized a large gain on the sale of the old home. 2
Viewed in light of section 102 and the norm of carryover
basis for non-taxable exchanges and receipts, section 1014,
revived by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, seems
anomalous. It reinstates a serious internal tension in the in-
come tax that may affect decisions made by estate planners. 13
This anomaly creates an income tax bias against lifetime gifts be-
cause testamentary and other death transfers secure a forgiveness
of the pent-up income tax. A taxpayer is severely penalized if he
sells highly appreciated property at any point in his life when
death can be expected to come before the cash to be realized by
such a sale is needed.' 4
The tension created by sections 1014 and 1015 can be illus-
trated by an example involving a wealthy individual who wants to
give his vacation home to his children. Assuming that the transfer
tax system aggregates all gratuitous transfers at death 15 and
forgetting for a moment the $3,000 annual exclusion,' 6 the owner
might give the property to his children either all at once or in
undivided interests.1 7  After the 1976 Tax Reform Act endorsed
carryover basis and unification of gifts with death transfers, the
only cost associated with such a gift was the income lost on any
gift taxes actually paid. This cost was offset by the considerable
advantages of excluding any post-gift appreciation of the property
12 I.R.C. § 1034.
13 See 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
915-22 (1972) (reprinting U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, 91sT CONG., lST SESS., TAX REFORM STUDIES
AND PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 1969)) [hereinafter cited as S. SURREY & W. WARREN].
14 See, e.g., Miller, Certain Aspects of Estate Planning for the Business Owner, 33 N.Y.U.
TAX INST. 81, 87 (1975).
15 Gifts made before January 1, 1977, are not included in the taxable estate for estate
tax computation purposes. I.R.C. § 2001(b). They are, however, included in all gift tax
calculations. I.R.C. § 2502(a), (c). See notes 139-141 and accompanying text infra.
16 I.R.C. § 2503(b) excludes the first $3,000 worth of gifts of present interests in prop-
erty to each individual in each year. A "present interest" is anything other than a "future
interest." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3 (1958). A present interest must be a mandatory, im-
mediate property interest. See notes 96-108 and accompanying text infra.
17 Gifts of substantial undivided interests in property can qualify as gifts even if the do-
nor retains a significant portion of the property, also in undivided form. See C. LOWNDES,
R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 749-50 (1974). A donor might
wish to make a gift of undivided interests in order to qualify for multiple annual exclusions
with respect to a single donee.
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and excluding the gift tax actually paid from the gross estate at
death.' 8
The revival of section 1014 upsets the income tax neutrality
between lifetime and death transfers accomplished by the 1976
Tax Reform Act.19 Under the new Act, if the same owner gives
the property to his children during his lifetime, they may take it
at a basis lower than fair market value. If the children sub-
sequently sell the property, they must pay a capital gains tax on
the unrealized appreciation (iin addition to paying indirectly the
gift tax by way of a diminution of the father's estate before
death). On the other hand, if the father transfers the property at
death, its appreciation will be exempt from income tax on a sub-
sequent sale. This new factor will frequently discourage inter-vivos
gifts of appreciated property.
In view of the foregoing and the widespread criticism of the
section 1014 rule, it was not surprising that the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 replaced section 1014 with section 1023, providing a
carryover basis, with certain adjustments, for the estates of dece-
dents dying after December 11, 1976. Shortly after enactment,
Congress began to change its mind and in the Revenue Act of
1978, ' 0 deferred its application to the estates of decedents dying
after December 31, 1979. Finally, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980 repealed it except for certain estates which may
elect its coverage. 21
II
THE TRANSFER TAX CONTEXT
The demise of section 1023 does not change the fact that
viewed from the income tax perspective, section 1014 does not fit
well. The income tax is not the only relevant perspective; ap-
preciated property is also subject to transfer taxation.2 2  It is true
"8 These advantages are secured only if the donor survives for three years after the
date of the gift. I.R.C. § 2035. See notes 142-147 and accompanying text infra.
19 The 1976 Act was not totally neutral. It "grandfathered" most appreciation earned
as of December 31, 1976 through the "fresh-start" adjustment. I.R.C. § 1023(h). Property
acquired after December 31, 1976, received no fresh start adjustment. The 1976 Act also
continued a preference for lifetime transfers by not grossing up adjusted taxable gifts,
made more than three years before death, to include any gift tax paid. JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976, H.R. REP. No. 10612,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 526-27 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMM.].
20 Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2884
21 Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(d), 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
22 I.R.C. § 2033 reaches all property owned by a decedent, including items of accrued
but unpaid income, even though they still are taxable income when received. The pro rata
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that the transfer tax system looks to the entire value of property,
not just appreciation, but taxation by the two systems is con-
templated.
Although the stillbirth of section 1023 may be puzzling in
light of prevailing income tax notions, one can understand it in
the transfer tax context. The 1976 amendments and the consist-
ent congressional attitude toward this system over the years reflect
five recurring, major themes in the transfer tax system. First, the
transfer tax system, although not a great revenue raiser, is a seri-
ous and independent approach to the problem of finding in-
dividuals from whom tax dollars may appropriately be taken. 23
Section 102, excepting gratuitous transfers from the definition of
income, 24 separates the taxation of income from the taxation of
wealth transfers. Congress's revamping of the latter system indi-
cates its intention to continue a dual tax system rather than move
toward an accessions tax 25 or a more comprehensive income tax.26
Second, the transfer tax system is concerned with the very
wealthy; 27 it is designed to tax great concentrations of wealth.2"
Congress has never precisely defined "great concentrations of
wealth" and has typically aimed the transfer taxes at a level of
wealth higher 29 than where many commentators 30 think it should
be aimed.
Third, the transfer system ignores technicalities of title and
ownership and focuses on the realities or substance of power and
portion of the estate tax attributable to the inclusion of such an item of income may be
deducted from the gross income of the recipient. I.R.C. § 691(c).
2" This assessment is supported by the finding of a recent study of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that the United States's transfer tax
system collects more revenue, as a percentage of gross domestic product, than any other
industrialized nation's. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
TAXATION OF NET WEALTH, CAPITAL TRANSFERS AND CAPITAL GAINS OF INDIVIDUALS 19
(1979).
24 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
25 See note 92 and accompanying text infra.
26 See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
27 B. BIrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE & GIrT TAXATION 983-85 (4th ed.
1972).
28 Only two percent of all decedents have gross estates that exceed the 1981 exemption
equivalent, $175,625, of the $47,000 unified credit. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL
& H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 832 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S.
SURREY].
29 Id. at 831-37.
" For a characteristically sensible suggestion as to an appropriate level for taxation to
commence, see Bittker, Federal Estate Tax Reform, Exemptions and Rates, 57 A.B.A.J. 236
(1971).
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control.3' For example, the estate tax treats an individual who
creates a trust and retains a life estate as the "owner" of the trust
corpus at his death, even though he has parted with legal title and
significant other aspects of ownership.3 2  Section 2040 deems an
individual who dies owning a joint tenancy interest in property as
the owner of the entire property, except any portion which can be
proven to have been attributable to contributions of any other
joint tenants, 33 even if the respective joint tenants' interests are
vested and alienable under state law.3 4  Moreover, the generation
skipping rules tax, at the bracket of the "deemed transferor,"
property held in trust at the expiration or termination of any
prior power or interest in the property, even interests as insub-
stantial as special powers of appointment 35 or discretionary life
interests in trusts created by someone other than the life tenant.36
Fourth, Congress has over the years extended the transfer
tax system to include many transactions and property interests
which have appeared and for which taxation is appropriate, given
the basic rules of the estate tax.37 The elaborate generation skip-
ping system is solid evidence of this.38  The excising of lump sum
distributions, which receive favorable income tax treatment, from
the extraordinary exemption accorded to interests in qualified
pension plans under section 2039(c), is another.3:1
Finally, and most tentatively, Congress has taken steps to
unify the gift and estate tax system. The 1976 Act created a uni-
fied tax base which includes taxable gifts made after December
31 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (1958).
32 I.R.C. § 2036.
I.R.C. § 2040 applies to real property and some types of personal property.
3' Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(b) (1958).
3 I.R.C. § 2613(d). I.R.C. § 2613(e)(1) exempts a special power of appointment if (1)
the holder has no other present or future power or interest in the trust; and (2) if that
power is exercisable only in favor of a person or class of persons who are lineal descend-
ants of the grantor assigned to a generation or generations younger than the power
holder.
36 I.R.C. § 2613(d)(1)(A) covers mandatory income interests and § 2613(d)(1)(B) covers
discretionary income interests. See JOINT Comm., supra note 19, at 566-67.
37 Progress on this front has been slow since the early 1950's. Congress was active in
the previous decades correcting legislative oversights in response to avoidance schemes.
The historical development of the power of appointment provision of the estate tax, I.R.C.
§ 2041, is illustrative. See S. SURREY, supra note 28, at 513-15.
38 Although many practitioners thought the generation skipping tax came out of
nowhere, it was the result of a Treasury and an American Law Institute study that detailed
the "abuses" it was designed to eliminate. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, 91ST CONG., lST SESs.,
TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS pt. 3, at 388-92 (Joint Comm. Print 1969); Casner,
American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, 22 TAx L. REV. 515 (1967).
39 I.R.C. § 2039(c), (f).
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31, 1976, and a decedent's taxable estate. 40  A single unified
credit 41 replaced the old gift tax and estate tax exemptions 42 and
Congress amended section 2035 to gross-up the estate by the
amount of any gift tax paid along with any gift, made within
three years of death. 43
III
REPEAL AND THE FUTURE
The 1976 transfer tax changes and the themes described
above seem politically secure. One cannot help but think that this
stability and the fate of section 1023 are linked. The linkage ap-
pears to be that Congress's choice to retain the two system
approach to revenue raising may make it difficult to tax appreci-
ation in property passed at death.44 This is not to say that section
1023 did not make sense as an income tax matter, but that tight-
ening the transfer tax system made it impossible to change simul-
taneously the long-standing rule which appeared, in a crude way,
to prevent imposition of a double tax. The 1976 Act may, there-
fore, have been politically unstable because it appeared to indi-
cate that Congress was rejecting the comprehensive tax base ap-
proach and at the same time was making a significant concession
to those who wished to move in that direction. 45
This assessment of the reasons behind the' repeal of section
1023 is, of course, speculative. The Senate Finance Committee at-
tempted to rationlize the repeal by stating:
Administrators of estates have testified that compliance
with the carryover basis provisions has caused a significant
increase in the time required to administer an estate and has
resulted in raising the overall cost of administration. The com-
mittee believes that the carryover basis provisions are unduly
40 I.R.C. §§ 2001(b), 2001(c), 2502.
41 I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505. In the case of a deceased deemed transferor who fails to
consume his entire unified credit in his estate's final tax accounting, the unused portion
may be applied to offset any generation skipping tax. I.R.C. § 2602(c)(3).
42 The 1976 Act repealed I.R.C. § 2052, which provided a $60,000 exemption from
the gross estate, and repealed I.R.C. § 2521, which provided a $30,000 lifetime exemption
for inter-vivos transfer.
41 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1848 (1976) (amending I.R.C. § 2035(c)).
4' This was the justification for the bifurcated income tax rule as it existed before
1976. See S. SURREY & W. WARREN, supra note 13, at 898.
45 Replacement of I.R.C. § 1014 with a carryover rule is a softer approach to trying to
change the rule of I.R.C. § 102. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 945-46.
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complicated. The committee therefore believes that the car-
ryover basis provisions should be repealed. 46
The literature is devoid of complaints by those who receive the
benefit of similarly complex carryover basis provisions in the
Code.4 7  If it is so hard to cope with carryover basis at death, why
has section 1015 worked without much comment for gifts? 48 Con-
gress could have greatly reduced the complexity of section 1023
by eliminating the "fresh-start" adjustment 49 and the other soften-
ing adjustments. 50  Alternatively, it might have levied capital
gains taxes on the net unrealized appreciation at death as a part
of the final income tax return of the decedent or the decedent's
estate. 51 Significantly, Congress did not address the problem it
identified, but instead simply repealed the provision.
The Senate committee's explanation for the repeal of section
1023 is particularly unpersuasive in light of the continued vitality
of the carryover basis rule to gifts under section 1015.52 How
can Congress justify such a distinction when no income tax policy
supports it? With the trend towards unification of the gift and
estate taxes, what transfer tax policy supports such radically dif-
fering income tax consequences? Administrative considerations
and prevention of tax avoidance may partially answer these ques-
tions.
46 S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 122, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1008, 1128-29.
47 Corporate reorganization plans, for example, often employ extraordinarily complex
procedures to obtain the advantages of carryover basis. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FED-
ERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14-1 to 14-152 (1971).
4' The only apparent distinction is the fact of the donor's death. This may complicate
determining the original cost basis for carryover purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015(a)(3)
(1971) provides that, if a donor's basis is unknown to the donee (and incidentally the Dis-
trict Director), then the basis is assumed to be the fair market value of the property at the
time the donor acquired it. The 1976 Act reports endorsed this sensible regulation for
I.R.C. § 1023 purposes also. JOINT Co,!MM., supra note 19, at 563.
4" I.R.C. § 1023(h) provided for an upward adjustment to the December 31, 1976,
value of any carryover basis property, for gain purposes only. The adjustment was to ac-
tual market value in the case of marketable bonds and securities and to a deemed value,
based on a fractional formula, for other property.
50 I.R.C. § 1023(c) provided an upward adjustment for applicable federal and state
estate taxes and § 1023(d) provided an upward adjustment to $60,000, if the aggregate
basis of all carryover basis property was less than that figure. In addition, I.R.C.
§ 1023(b)(3) provided an exemption for up to $10,000 worth of personal or household
effects.
5' In 1963 President Kennedy proposed taxing accrued but unrealized appreciation at
death. See HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., PRESIDENT'S 1963 TAX MESSAGE, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 20 (1963). The Treasury re-endorsed this idea in 1969. U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, supra
note 38, at 118.
52 See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
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If Congress has decided that gifts and bequests should prop-
erly be handled entirely outside the income tax system, then the
step-up and step-down rule of section 1014 should logically be
extended to gifts. A major difficulty with extending the step-up/
step-down rule to inter-vivos gifts, however, is that it would intro-
duce a significant possibility for evasion of income taxes. One can
easily imagine family members triggering a step-up in basis
through an intra-family gift of property followed by a sale and
use of the proceeds for shared consumption. The value returned
to the donor would escape taxation under the present system be-
cause, in general, shared consumption by members of the same
household does not constitute a taxable "transfer." 53 The family
would escape all income tax on the unrealized gain attributable to
the donor's ownership. The only tax-although its magnitude
should not be underestimated-would be the gift tax. 54
Even more fundamental than the possibility of an avoidance
through shared consumption is the fact that merely by changing
the order of events a donor could produce very different tax con-
sequences. If he sold appreciated property and gave the proceeds
away, he would be in receipt of income and might have to pay a
gift tax. But if he gave the property directly to the donee who
then sold it, both could escape the income tax. Such radically dif-
ferent consequences stemming from essentially the same transac-
tion are indefensible. The well-advised would give first and the
unadvised might not.
Section 1015-not section 1014-may now be the greater
anomaly. If so, it is understandable primarily as a prophylactic
provision aimed at an unrelated but serious problem: the poten-
tial for evasion inherent in the lifetime family gifts. Section 1014
should be viewed as the norm; a step-up or step-down of basis
with a reliance on the transfer tax system to assess and collect any
revenue. Because death removes the donor, abuse of the shared
consumption type is not a consideration. Viewed in this way, the
holding of appreciated property until death does not result in
avoidance of the income tax system; instead, it is a function of the
need to eliminate the administrative difficulty of discovering and
53 I.R.C. § 2511.
"' Even if the donor does not directly share in the consumption, one can conceive so
many analogous situations that the meat-axe approach of I.R.C. § 1015 seems justified.
Thus, a gift of stock to a grown child to pay for educational expenses, although it does not
directly benefit the donor, approximates such a benefit.
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taxing shared consumption in the family context after an inter-
vivos transfer 55 and from the more fundamental problem dis-
cussed above.
If this view is correct, and Congress has decided to leave tax-
ation of net unrealized appreciation at death to the transfer tax
system, then what is the proper response to the Crude Oil
Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980? The options include doing noth-
ing, bringing section 1015 into line with section 1014,56 or
strengthening the transfer tax system.
If the thesis advanced above as to why Congress withdrew
section 1023 is correct, then it is also a good reason for Congress
to continue reforming the transfer taxes. If they really are to cover
the ground which section 102 gives them, then the rules should
not treat wealth taxation in a hit or miss or formalistic manner. In
addition, the revenue loss arising from the repeal of section 1023
justifies the production of more revenue through the transfer
taxes themselves.
IV
MORE TRANSFER TAX REFORM
A. Increasing the Yield
Even though the 1976 Act reforms tightened and unified the
transfer ta: system, they were intended to reduce the estate
yield.5 7  The enactment of the unified credit, which when fully
" See Hanrahan, A Proposal for Constructive Realization of Gains and Losses in Transfers of
Property by Gift and at Death, 15 KAN. L. REv. 133 (1966).
16 See Heckering, The Death of "Stepped-Up" Basis at Death, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. 247
(1964).
37 The following chart shows the pre- and post-1976 yields for various decedents in
some not untypical situations. In each pre-1977 case, full utilization of the $60,000 estate
and $30,000 gift exemptions is assumed. In all cases it is assumed that no taxable gifts have
been made and that there are no other deductible items.
Pre-1977 Tax
Pre-1977 Unmarried With Maximum
Original Taxable Pre-1977 Marital
Gross Wealth Estate Tax Deduction
$ 150,000 $ 60,000 $ 9,500 $ 3,000
400,000 310,000 84,900 37,200
750,000 660,000 201,700 91,300
2,090,000 2,000,000 753,200 325,700
5,090,000 5,000,000 2,469,200 998,200
10,090,000 10,000,000 6,088,200 2,468,200
25,090,000 25.000,000 17,638,200 8,013,200
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phased in on January 1, 1981, will more than make up for the
elimination of the flat exemptions for lifetime gifts and estates,
accomplished this.58  In addition, Congress unified the estate,
gift, and generation skipping tax tables in the uppermost range of
wealth at a marginal rate below the estate tax rate in effect before
the 1976 Act.5 9
Congress reduced the estate tax yield for at least three
reasons. First, the old gift tax rates were three-quarters of the old
estate tax rates and Congress apparently tried to levy a unified tax
with a gentler impact. Second, section 1023 promised significant
increases in income tax revenue which balanced out any losses in
transfer tax revenues.60 Finally, the tax reduction may have
facilitated the passage of the new Act and in particular the genera-
tion skipping tax.
The reduction in yield projected by the 1976 Act, in the light
of the repeal of section 1023 in 1980, is no longer reconcilable
with the major goals of the transfer tax system. If the aim of the
system is to level great concentraions of wealth, it is hard to un-
derstand why Congress reduced from seventy-seven percent to
1981 Tax
With Maximum
1981 Unmarried 1981 Marital
Taxable Tax (with uni- Deduction
Estate fled credit) (with unified credit)
S 150,000 $ 0 0 
400,000 74,800 0
750,000 201,300 66,300
2,090,000 777,900 317,250
5,090,000 2,566,800 1,002,650
10,090,000 6,066,800 2,535,300
25,090,000 16,566,800 7,785,300
58 See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
59 See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2501, 2601. The 1976 Act adopted a large exemption equivalent
($175,625) and high marginal rates from the onset of taxability. Thus, the 1976 Act poten-
tially increased the yields in estates ranging from $1,000,000 to $15,000,000. Congress did
not explain why transfer tax increases were appropriate for estates in this range when the
marginal rate for estates in excess of $10,000,000 were reduced.
60 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the following long range revenue effect
of the 1976 Act changes: (1) unified rates and credit, -$1.23 billion, (2) marital deduction,
-$158 million, (3) valuation, -$14 million, (4) extension of time, less than +$500,000, (5)
unification, +$300 million (6) generation skipping, +$280 million, and (7) carryover basis
+$1.08 billion: for a net gain of $263 million. See JOINT COMM., supra note 19, at 21 n.7.
By contrast, Congress projected the revenue effect of the repeal of carryover basis in
I.R.C. § 1023 at -$36 million in 1981, -$95 million in 1982, -$330 million in 1985, and
-$950 million in 1990. S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1008, 1129.
seventy percent, the marginal tax bracket of a decedent with total
taxable gratuitous transfers in his lifetime and at death in excess
of $10,000,000.61 In following up on the repeal of section 1023,
Congress should increase the transfer tax unified rates to produce
revenue proportional to estate tax revenues before 1976. Finally,
the repeal of section 1023 will involve a significant revenue loss 62
and because of Congress's decision to rely on the transfer tax sys-
tem to tax (and raise revenue from) gratuitous transfers, increas-
ing the yield is appropriate.
B. Ending Unjustifiable Exemptions
The repeal of section 1023 also should be the occasion to
pursue reform in line with the themes Congress has endorsed by
revising some provisions of the current estate and gift tax system.
Although there may be other appropriate curtailments, any
agenda for reform must include the section 2039(c) exclusion of
certain payments from qualified pension plans, the sections 2522
and 2055 exemptions for gifts and bequests to qualifying charities,
and the section 2053 $3,000 per donee annual exclusion.
1. Section 2039(c)
First, Congress should remove the exclusion from the gross
estate 63 of a deceased participant in a qualified retirement plan of
the value of a survivor annuity or any other payment payable to
anyone other than the executor 64 (other than a lump sum
distribution taxed preferentially in the income tax system). The
section 2039(c) exclusion is inconsistent with the notion that the
holding of substantial power over property justifies taxation. The
exclusion is not an inducement to the adoption of qualified
plans 65 because of the indirect and uncertain possibility of the
61 See note 59 and accompanying text supra. In an excellent article published in 1956,
Louis Eisenstein concluded that Congress created the transfer tax system to raise revenue.
Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAx L. REV. 223 (1956). Mr. Eisenstein
frankly admitted, however, that as time went on and Congress tinkered with that system
(including occasional major tax reductions), the only continuing justification for the trans-
fer tax system has been to level great concentrations of wealth. Id.
62 See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
63 I.R.C. § 2039(c). Section 2039(c) has been everyone's, including the Treasury's,
favorite loophole to close, but it has escaped repeal. See U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, supra note 38,
at 376-77.
64 Payments to the executor are excluded because such payments become part of the
probate estate subject to the claims of creditors.
65 The primary goal of such plans is the maximization of retirement income, and it is
hard to see how a benefit dependent upon a death before a complete pay-out of benefits
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conference of the section 2039(c) benefit on any particular person
or group.66  In addition, the power a deceased participant has
over such interests is indistinguishable from a power over an in-
surance policy or a non-qualified plan annuity. 67 Finally, no
dreamy notion that the employer is actually conferring the benefit
on the survivor (and the decedent was not, therefore, the
"owner") should defeat taxation. The reality is that the decedent
controls the beneficiary's identity 68 and has other powers suffi-
cient to justify taxation.
2. Sections 2522 and 2055
More controversial, but in policy terms very similar to the
section 2039(c) exemption, are the sections 2522 and 2055 69
exemptions for qualifying 70 gifts and bequests made to qualifying
charities. 71  It is clear that a donor exercises substantial power
can be related to this purpose. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION PoUcY, AN IN-
TERM REPORT 19-26 (May 1980), reprinted in [May 30, 1980] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH)
Supp. 270; Osgood, Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plan Vesting: Revolution not Reform,
59 B.U.L. REV. 452 (1979).
66 Conference of the I.R.C. § 2039(c) benefit depends on death before distribution to a
retired participant. Because one of the requirements for qualified status is that benefits be
paid out at or during retirement and not "hoarded" in the qualified plan until death, it is
particularly difficult to engineer one's estate into a position to benefit under I.R.G.
§ 2039(c). See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1976); Rev. Rul. 56-656, 1956-2 C.B. 280; Rev.
Rul. 72-241, 1972-1 C.B. 108. If a retired employee receives all of his interest in the plan
and then dies, I.R.C. § 2039(c) protects nothing, but if he resists distribution, dies, and his
designated beneficiary elects any form of payment other than a preferentially taxed lump-
sum treatment, I.R.C. § 2039(c) excludes it completely.
67 A participant typically can elect the form of the survivor benefit and the identity of
the beneficiaries. Such powers are incidents of ownership which would bring a life insur-
ance policy into a decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2042. Non-qualified plan annuities
are fully taxable (e.g., the value of any survivor benefits) under I.R.C. § 2039(a). The I.R.C.
§ 2039(c) exclusion applies only to the portion of the value of the benefits, typically 100%,
attributable to employer, as opposed to employee, contributions,
68 Although it is hard to ascertain the origin of this argument, which is still occasionally
advanced, it may be related to the exemption from I.R.C. § 2033 for the Social Security
death and survivor benefits.
69 The gift and estate tax charitable deductions are very similar to each other and both
are different from the income tax charitable deduction of I.R.C. § 170.
'0 A gift of less than a fee interest in property including a remainder interest or an
income interest must be in the form of a (1) charitable remainder unitrust, (2) charitable
remainder annuity trust, (3) pooled income fund, or (4) charitable lead trust. I.R.C.
§ 2055(e)(2). I.R.C. § 644 governs (1) and (2), I.R.C. § 642(c) governs (3); and I.R.C.
§ 2055(e)(2)(B) governs (4).
71 The transfer tax system's two definitions of qualifying charitable donees are not
coterminous with those charities qualifying for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
For instance, veterans organizations are not (c)(3) organizations, but are eligible donees
under I.R.C. §§ 2055(a)(4) and 2522(b)(5).
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over property when he makes a charitable transfer during life or
by will.7 2  Commentators defend these exclusions 73 as necessary
inducements to charitable giving which enhance the pluralistic
character of American society. 74
The inducement argument actually has been aimed, for the
most part, at ensuring the continuance of the income tax-not
the transfer tax-deduction. 75  Most charitable gifts are made
during life. Wealthy people tend to make gifts of appreciated cap-
ital to offset taxation of current income. 76  Such donors also are
relying in some way on not having to pay a transfer tax on their
gift to a charity.
There is widespread agreement among tax commentators on
the undesirability of the present income tax deduction accorded
for gifts to charities.77 They attack it as a double benefit, permit-
ting apples (gifts of capital) to be used to substitute for oranges
(taxation of current income) and as a subsidy that benefits only
the wealthy because most non-wealthy people who make charita-
ble contributions do not usually have itemized deductions in ex-
cess of their zero bracket amount. 7  This generalized attack on
the charitable deduction has led commentators to call for elimina-
tion, curtailment, or replacement79 of the section 170 deduction.
In rare cases there has been discussion of the transfer tax deduc-
tions.
The attack on the income tax deduction has failed to gener-
ate congressional action, except for some gentle narrowing of the
rules governing the deductibility of interests of appreciated and
ordinary income property. Moreover, the charities recently have
launched an effort to place the charitable deduction "above the
72 The power aspects, especially in the context of bequests to family-controlled
charities, became so troubling not only as to appropriateness of the donee but in the sense
of continued control that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 placed certain limits on the deducti-
bility of such gifts. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(1), 2422(c)(I).
73 See S. SURREY, supra note 28, at 863-67. For an alternative explanation, see Bittker,
Charitable Bequests and the Federal Estate Tax: Proposed Restrictions on Deductibility, 31 THE
RECORD 159 (1976).
71 See Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1090 (1976).
" See S. SURREY, supra note 28, at 863-67.
71 See A. FELD, M. O'HARE &J. SHUSTER, THE PATRON NOBODY KNOWS (1980) (Study for
the Twentieth Century Fund).
71 See, e.g., McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for
the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX. L. REV. 377 (1972).
11 See A. FELD, M. O'HARE & J. SHUSTER, supra note 76, at 407-09.
79 See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 77; Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other
Exempt Organizations: The Need for a National Policy, 20 S. CAL. TAX INST. 27 (1968).
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line," meaning to have charitable contributions deductible in addi-
tion to (not first counted against) the zero bracket amount.80
The transfer tax charitable deduction is as anomalous as the
income tax deduction and Congress should curtail it. The transfer
tax system taxes the donor's wealth and power. 8' There are very
few instances in which a decedent or a living person can exercise
power over property in a significant way and escape taxation; 82
section 2039(c) is one and should be eliminated. The marital de-
duction is another, but it is distinguishable because there is a good
prospect of ultimate taxation in the survivor's estate.8 3
Imbedded in the inducement argument made by proponents
of the charitable transfer tax deduction are two notions. First, the
eleemosynary character of the recipients justifies exemption. This
argument focuses on the identity of the donee contrary to the
general policy of the transfer tax system. The transfer tax is
levied on the aggregate of the individual's wealth and is not, un-
like an inheritance tax, based on the number of beneficiaries or
their consanguinity to the testator or donor, as the case may be.
The marital and orphan's deductions are two exceptions to the
statute's lack of interest in the beneficiary. The marital deduction
is distinguishable again because of the prospect of taxation within
the same generation. The argument for the orphan's deduction,
based on the potential need of the recipients,8 4 is weak and does
not justify the deduction.
80 The recent Senate proposal to this effect, S.219, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., and the
House version, H.R. 1785, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., had numerous sponsors.
81 By contrast, an inheritance tax focuses on the recipient's identity and wealth. The
once discredited inheritance tax concept has been modified and given respectability under
the name of an "accessions" tax. See Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAx L. REV.
589 (1967). Professor Andrews's support for an accessions tax fits nicely with his support
of an income tax system based on consumption. Andrews, A Consumption T)pe or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
" Two other provisions which focus on the donee or the nature of the property in-
terest provide tax breaks regardless of donor power. I.R.C. § 2032A provides for preferen-
tial "use" valuation for certain farming or small business property. Qualification for this
exception involves compliance with stringent initial and continuing tests. A lapse in com-
pliance triggers a "recapture" of the foregone tax. Many commentators think these rules
are so stringent that estates will avoid I.R.C. § 2032A. See, e.g., Hajorth, Special Estate Tax
Valuation of Farmland and the Emergence of a Landholding Elite Class, 53 WASH. L. REv. 609
(1978); Holtorf, Analysis of the Actual Use Valuation Procedure of Section 2032A, 56 NEB. L.
REV. 860 (1977). Other related preferences accorded estates of deceased small business
owners are the low interest and deferment features of I.R.C. § 6166. To qualify, a small
business must constitute a substantial proportion of an estate. See I.R.C. § 6166A for the
old 10-year extension in the case of estates which are somewhat more liquid.
83 See notes 113-138 and accompanying text infra.
84 The word "orphan" means parentless, not poor, and the I.R.C. § 2057 deduction is
only available to people in the first category and then without regard to the deceased
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Second, proponents of the deduction argue that a transfer to
a charity is a transfer for the public interest (under the Code's
definition) and resembles a voluntary payment of tax more than
an exercise of power.15  Many transfers, such as gifts to needy
friends or relatives, are logically within the ambit of this argument
and yet fall outside the Code rules. At the same time, a deduction
is available for gifts to veterans' organizations, to fraternal lodges,
to museums named for and glorifying the donor, to wealthy pri-
vate schools educating primarily children of the wealthy, and to a
variety of organizations supporting causes which it is unlikely that
the government would support. The voluntary payment of tax ar-
gument is at variance with what is included in and what is
excluded from the scope of sections 2522 and 2055.
The transfer tax charitable deduction should, for the reason
that it is an unjustifiable and extraordinary exception to the rule
that power over wealth is the incident of taxation, be eliminated.
If Congress finds the political opposition to the elimination of the
charitable deduction too fierce, several steps could be taken to
harmonize it with the rest of the transfer tax system. One possible
modification would be to remove the charitable gift or bequest
from the estate before the calculation of any marital deduction. 6
Presently, a charitable bequest remains in the gross estate for mar-
ital deduction purposes but is removed for calculation pur-
poses.8 7 An alternative modification would be to remove it
from the estate for all purposes. Of course, if sections 2522 and
2055 are repealed and charitable transfers made non-deductible,
they should be included in the estate for any marital deduction
computation as well.
A second partial curtailment of the charitable deduction
would be to place a flat dollar ceiling on the amount of property
that could be transferred on a deductible basis under sections
2522 and 2055.88 Such a ceiling would permit limited bequests to
parent or orphan's other wealth. A "poor" orphan's parent's estate needs no deduction and
I.R.C. § 2057 provides no refundable credit.
85 See B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note 7, at 190.
86 This could be done by amending the definition of the computation base in I.R.C.
§ 2056, the "adjusted gross estate," to remove bequests deductible under I.R.C. § 2055.
87 Under the present law, if a decedent dies with a federal gross estate of $10,000,000,
leaving half to his wife and half to a qualifying charity, no tax is due. If, however, a
decedent dies with $10,000,000 of property, owing $5,000,000 to a creditor and leaving the
other half to his wife, the allowable marital deduction is only $2,500,000. His estate will
pay a tax of over $900,000. Exclusion of the charitable bequest would bring results of
the first case in line with the second. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(c)(2), 2055.
88 Professor Paul R. McDaniel has suggested replacing the income tax charitable con-
tribution deductions with a federal matching grant program. McDaniel, supra note 77, at
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the main class of charities which rely on such gifts- educational
institutions89 -while protecting the integrity of the transfer tax
system. Congress could impose such a ceiling in conjunction with
the earlier suggestion of removing charitable gifts from the gross
estate for marital deduction computation purposes. A flat dollar
limitation, rather than a percentage limitation, would better serve
the goal of leveling great concentrations of wealth.90  Although
any ceiling is inconsistent with the power argument made earlier,
a ceiling would at least prevent the funding of massive charitable
institutions which perpetuate a particular donor or his family at
the expense of the Treasury.
A third partial way to cut back on the charitable deduction is
to leave the charitable gift in the taxable estate when the tentative
tax9 l1 is computed. Under the post-1976 system, a deemed tax is
then computed on all prior taxable gifts and this amount is sub-
tracted from the tentative tax. Charitable gifts could be treated as
prior taxable gifts for purposes of computing an offset to the ten-
tative tax. Under this procedure the marginal rate of the tax on
the taxable portion of a gift or estate would reflect the true
aggregate wealth of the decedent.
A simple example illustrates this proposal. Assume that an
individual with a gross estate of $2,000,000 dies unmarried, hav-
ing made $100,000 of taxable gifts after December 31, 1976, but
more than three years before death. Under the present system a
$1,000,000 bequest to charity reduces this decedent's gross estate
by $1,000,000, leaving a taxable estate of $1,000,000. A tentative
tax is computed on the sum of the taxable estate ($1,000,000) and
the prior gifts ($100,000) or $1,100,000. Next, the tax on
$100,000 is determined and subtracted from the tentative tax on
$1,100,000. The tax due, without regard to the unified credit, is
$363,000.92 If the charitable bequest was left in the taxable es-
tate, as proposed here, the tentative tax would first be computed
on a base of $2,100,000. From that tax the tax on $1,100,000
395-406. Professor David Westfall has suggested a percentage limitation on the estate tax
charitable deduction and other limitations on the gift tax charitable deduction. See Westfall,
Revitalizing the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARV. L. REV. 986, 1005 (1970).
89 Sunley, Dimensions of Charitable Giving Reported on Federal Estate, Gift and Fiduciary
Returns, reprinted in COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUBLIC NEEDS, STUDY (1974).
90 But see Westfall, supra note 88, at 1005.
91 The tentative tax of I.R.C. § 2001 is computed on the value of the taxable estate
plus adjusted taxable gifts made after December 31, 1976. The taxable estate is the gross
estate less allowable deductions including the charitable deduction of I.R.C. § 2055.
92 The tentative tax on $1,100,000 is $386,800 less the deemed tax on $100,000,
$23,800, producing a tax due of $363,000. I.R.C. § 2001(c).
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would be subtracted, leaving a tax due, without regard to the
credit, of $443,000. 93
This change may at first appear incorrect because it seems as
though the extra $80,000 is a tax on the charitable gift. The tax
on the $1,000,000 is fully backed out at the end, and is of course
a phantom tax; no tax is paid on a charitable gift. In reality, this
operation insures that the taxable portion of the estate,
$1,000,000, is taxed at the rates applicable to a decedent with
gross wealth of $2,100,000. This is correct, and it is interesting
that this operation is the opposite of the present system, which
leaves in the charitable bequest for the marital deduction compu-
tation (and therefore maximizes it) but takes it out for the tax
computation.94
Congress could adopt the partial approaches suggested sepa-
rately or together. Examples set out in the margin compare the
results of total abolition, the present system, and adoption of the
change in the marital deduction and computation method. "95
93 The tentative tax on $2,100,000 is $829,800 less the deemed tax on $1,100,000,
$386,800; producing a tax due of $443,000. I.R.C. § 2001(c).
94 See note 87 and the accompanying text supra.
95 1981: Deceased Married Taxpayer; No appreciation; Bequest of $500,000 to charity;
1/2 of estate to surviving wife.
(a) Original Gross Wealth
(b) Taxable Gifts Made
more than 3 years
before death not
to the spouse
(c) Gross Estate
(d) Charitable Contri-
bution Deduction
(e) Marital Deduction
(f) Taxable Estate
(g) Adjusted Taxable
Gifts
(h) Code § 2001 Tax
Base: Sum of (f)
& (g)
Present
System
$2,100,000
100,000
2,000,000
500,000
1,000,000
500,000
100,000
Abolition
$2,100,000
100,000
2,000,000
0
1,000,000
1,000,000
100,000
600,000 1,100,000
Removal of
Charitable
Contribution
from the
2056 concept
of an
Adjusted
Gross
Estate
$2,100,000
100,000
2,000,000
500,000
750,000
750,000
100,000
Leave
Charitable
Contribution
in for all
purposes
and treat as
a prior gift
taxable
transfer
$2,100,000
100,000
2,000,000
0
1,000,000
1,000,000
100,000
850,000 1,100,000
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Adoption of the unlimited marital deduction, as suggested below,
would deprive the change in the marital deduction computation
of any substantial revenue vitality.
3. Section 2503
Congress should revise the $3,000 per donee annual exclu-
sion of gifts of present interests. The success of the taxpayer in
Crummey v. Commissioner 96 and the Commissioner's apparent ac-
quiescence in the court's broad definition of present interest
illustrates that what was intended as a modest administrative
exemption has become a major vehicle for abuse.98 Congress
could overrule Crummey by amending section 2503 to provide
that all trust interests shall be deemed to be future interests,
except an irrevocable right to receive a sum of money in the
year of creation.99 Moreover, the Service should rule that the
gift of a life insurance policy, except to the extent of any cash
surrender value, and the payment of premiums, shall be gifts of
future interests. °00 Finally, the qualifying exclusions should only
(i) Tentative Tax 192,800 386,800 287,300 386,800
(j) Prior Gift Taxes 100,000 100,000 100,000 600,000
Payable Base
(k) Code § 2001(b) 0 0 0 145,800
Gift Taxes "Payable"
on amounts on line (j)
(1) Code § 2001 Tax Due 145,800 339,800 240,300 241,000
(Line (i) minus
line (k) minus
unused credit)
9 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
9 See Rev. Rul. 415, 1975-2 C.B. 374, in which Crummey is cited as support for the
proposition that an income interest that commences with the occurence of some significant
event (e.g., quitting college) is not a present interest.
'8 See S. SURREY, supra note 28, at 688-89.
This amendment need only cover vested, mandatory income interests. Other in-
terests in trusts, vested or contingent remainders, or discretionary income interests do not
now constitute present interests. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1958). See Westfall, supra note
88, at 993.
"' Treas. Reg. § 2 5.2503-3(a) (1958) would have to be revised to provide that the gift of
a life insurance policy or the payment of a premium on a policy owned by someone else is
a gift of a present interest only to the extent that the policy has a cash surrender value, or
in the case of a premium payment only to the extent that the cash surrender value is
thereby increased. Recently, in Rev. Rul. 80-289, I.R.B. 1980-43, at 16, the Service con-
ceded yet another issue in its battle to resist sophisticated tax planning involving the pres-
ent interest exclusion and interests in group life insurance maintained by employers. The
ruling holds that a new execution of an assignment of such interest will not restart the
three-year clock of I.R.C. § 2035 if occasioned by the employer's change of its group life
carrier.
be allowed up to some annual ceiling, fixed at some reasonably
low level, and only in the case of gifts to individuals whom the
donor has a legal obligation to support. 101
In 1954, Congress created a statutory exception to the re-
quirement that a gift be a present interest in order to qualify for
the exclusion, which should now be reconsidered. Section
2503(c) 102 excludes from the definition of a future interest a gift
for the benefit of a minor, if "the property and the income there-
from" are distributed to the minor (or pass according to his will
or exercise of a general power of appointment if he dies before
attaining age twenty-one). A number of courts 103 have interpreted
this provision to qualify a minor's income interest in a trust so
long as the trust requires distribution of all accumulated income
when the minor attains age twenty-one, even if the corpus is re-
tained for later distribution. The courts arrived at this interpreta-
tion by construing the word "property" to refer to the income and
remainder interests in the trust separately. These decisions permit
the discounted value of the minor's income interest to generate a
present interest exclusion but not the discounted value of the
right to the remainder.' 0 4  If the word "property" had been in-
terpreted to refer to the accumulated income and corpus to-
gether, then there would be no present interest exclusion unless
both were distributable to the minor upon attaining age twenty-
one.
In response to this case law, which is contrary to the intent
but not the language of section 2503, Congress might amend the
statute to require a distribution of both the accumulated income
and the corpus at age twenty-one. This solution is unsatisfactory
for several reasons. First, section 2503(c) is a provision that is used
101 Administrative policing problems justify a limited exemption for donees with whom
the donor has some very close connection. The selection of the legal obligation to support
standard is a reasonable one for identifying that group.
102 For a description of the origin and development of this section, see C. LOWNDES, R.
KRAMER & J. McCORD, supra note 17, at 823-33.
103 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Herr, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962); C.E. Weller, 38 T.C.
790 (1962). The Commissioner's acquiescence can be found in Rev. Rul. 670, 1968-2 C.B.
413.
104 Aggressive taxpayers and their lawyers have attempted to add to the qualifying pres-
ent interest portion of a gift in trust the value of a mandatory income interest which
commences at the time of the minor's attaining his majority and running for some period
thereafter. In Estate of Levine, 63 T.C. 136 (1974), rev'd, 526 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1975), the
Tax Court permitted the discounted value of this subsequent income interest to be "tacked
onto" the minority interest and thus allow both to qualify as present interest gifts, but the
Second Circuit reversed. See Commissioner v. Estate of Levine, 526 F.2d 717 (2d Cir.
1975).
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by the very wealthy. It requires that a trust be established by an
inter-vivos gift, which is generally done only by the very wealthy
after obtaining professional advice.' 0 5  Second, to the extent that
Congress wishes to protect minors, it should only make an excep-
tion from normal rules, in this case the requirement of a present
interest, when there is a compelling reason, such as to assist
minors who are genuinely without adequate support. The or-
phan's deduction, if revised to have a means test, might respond
to this need. For the foregoing reasons Congress should repeal
section 2503(c). To replace it, Congress should rationalize criteria
for making outright gifts to minors.10 6
A problem related to the abuse of the $3,000 per donee ex-
clusion involves noninterest bearing demand loans to close rela-
tions. In Crown v. Commissioner '0 7 the Seventh Circuit rejected the
Service's position, set forth in Revenue Ruling 73-61, °8 that such
a loan generates a taxable transfer in each calendar quarter that
the loan remains unpaid, equal to an arm's length interest rate
appropriate to the transaction. Although neither the Seventh Cir-
cuit nor the Ruling fully discuss the reasons why family loans are
administratively difficult, the Ruling does point out that in most
cases the $3,000 per donee exclusion will protect such transactions
from generating any tax liability.
Crown and the earlier district court decision in Johnson v.
United States 109 are understandable only because they arise in a
family context. Although the mere presence of a family relation-
ship is evidence of an intention to make a gift in many situations
for income tax purposes, 110 such a result would be inappropriate
in the transfer tax situation because the definition of and results
flowing from a characterization as a gift differ in the two sys-
tems.11' The logic supporting Crown is that an individual is not
0 U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, supra note 38, at 353.
106 A major reason for the enactment of I.R.C. § 2503(c) was to end the confusion and
diversity of results which obtained under various state law regimes with respect to outright
gifts to children. The different results were produced as a result of variances under state
law as to whether and when a minor could own property. Present subsection (c) goes
beyond clearing away these variances. Instead, Congress might provide that a gift to a
qualifying state law custodian of a minor's property would constitute a gift of a present
interest. One test of a qualifying custodianship might be a requirement that income be
distributed at least once a year.
107 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
108 Rev. Rul. 61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
109 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
110 See J. CHOMMIE, supra note 5, at 40.
'" Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(g) (1958). Donative intent is not an element of a transfer tax
gift. Instead, the issue is whether there has been a transfer for a consideration reducible to
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obliged to act in an economically sensible fashion toward family
members. He may lend money to a relative without interest and
not thereby make a gift of either the interest or the principal.
Although this analysis appeals to privacy instincts, the gift tax has
always utilized a mechanical definition of "gift": whether an
adequate consideration in money or money's worth has been re-
ceived on account of a transfer.1 12  This test is sound, especially
when loans of the magnitude of those found in the Crown case are
involved. Congress, therefore, should reinforce the statutory def-
inition of a gift in the interest free loan context by way of a joint
resolution endorsing the principles set out in Revenue Ruling
73-61.
C. Marital Deduction
Any plan to strengthen the transfer tax system must confront
the marital deduction. In a common law state an individual can,
while alive, give $100,000 tax free to his spouse. The next
$100,000 is potentially taxable, and the value of each gift to the
extent it exceeds $3,000, after the $200,000 point, is 50% tax-
able.' 13  At death, an individual may pass to his spouse tax-free
the greater of $250,000 or one-half of his adjusted gross estate
(adjusted downward by half the difference between full taxation
of lifetime gifts, if he made gifts totalling between zero and
$200,000 to his spouse while living)." 4
In community property states an individual may give to his
spouse on a deductible basis only separate property.' 15  At death
he may leave, tax free, the greater of one-half of his separate
property or $250,000 (less his wife's share of the community
property) worth of his share of community property to his surviv-
ing spouse.1 6 The creation of community property by the action
money or money's worth. Although Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), does
not fully embrace donative intent in the income tax situation, it does embrace something
very close to it.
112 I.R.C. § 2512. The Seventh Circuit skirts around another issue, whether a transfer
has occurred. This is really part of the same question because once it is conceded that the
non-collection of interest in a calendar quarter is a gift, then it follows that a transfer has
occurred.
113 I.R.C. § 2523(a)(I), (2).
114 I.R.C. § 2056.
115 I.R.C. § 2523(f).
116 A husband who gives his one-half of the community property to his wife (assuming
she has not worked during the marriage) cannot utilize the marital deduction because she
has already received the other half tax-free, as in effect a marital deduction transfer. I.R.C.
§ 2056(c)(1)(C) and (c)(2)(B) accomplish this by backing community property out of the
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of one spouse is not a taxable event to the other. 117  In either a
community property or a common law state, to secure a deduction
the donor-spouse must transfer the property outright, or in the
case of nonfee ownership gifts of property give substantial pow-
ers.
118
The marital deduction permits the tax free transfer of
enormous quantities of wealth to surviving spouses. Congress's
justification is that the wealth will be taxed on the death of the
spouse and transfer taxation should be levied only once in a gen-
eration. 1 9 Although the generation skipping system supports
this general notion, the transfer tax system, as a whole, does not
establish a generalized norm of once-in-a-generation taxation. If
individuals make multiple gifts of the same property within a
single generation, the Code taxes each transfer. Moreover, a sur-
viving spouse can consume or give away a substantial portion of a
marital deduction gift or bequest, thus preventing imposition of
even a single tax in a generation. Finally, the generational theory
justifies an unlimited marital deduction rather than one of
fifty percent. 1 2
0
"adjusted gross estate," as defined in I.R.C. § 2056(c)(2)(A), and property eligible for such
a deduction in I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A). The only exception to this rule is that if the wife's
interest in her deceased husband's community property is less than $250,000, then she may
receive tax-free from her husband a portion of his community property up to the point
that she has received from him $250,000. A corollary of this approach is that a husband or
wife with community property worth in the aggregate more than $500,000 can receive a
marital deduction only by giving or bequeathing separate property to each other.
If the justification for the marital deduction is that it equalizes the treatment of the
two major American state property law systems, then no deduction should theoretically be
required for a gift of separate property by a community property decedent. Congress un-
fortunately focused on a decedent owning all community property as the model, and then
chose the 50% rule for common law decedents. This in turn allows the community prop-
erty decedent's estate to deduct one-half of all separate property.
117 See S. SURREY, supra note 28, at 200-01.
118 Gifts of "terminable interests" are, with few exceptions, nondeductible. I.R.C.
§ 2056(b). The classic terminable interest is a life estate for the surviving spouse in real estate
with a remainder to a third party. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-(1)
(1958).
,19 This justification is post-hoc. Congress added the marital deduction to the Code in
1948 to equalize taxation of couples living in common law and community property states.
C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, supra note 17, at 436-38. The rationale that prop-
erty need be taxed only once in a generation is a recent theory. See note 166 and accom-
panying text infra. I.R.C. § 2013 is in line with the more recent justification of the marital
deduction. It provides a diminishing credit towards any estate tax owed by an estate, usu-
ally of a surviving wife, based on the amount of estate tax previously paid on property
received by the decedent within 10 years of death.
120 Congress has moved in the direction of an unlimited marital deduction for small
estates by providing that the first $250,000 of property passed to a surviving spouse, as-
suming no inter-vivos marital gifts, is nontaxable. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A)(i).
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An unlimited marital deduction is attractive for several
reasons. First, it would equalize the transfer tax results for couples
living in common law or community property states whether they
both work or not. The current marital deduction promises to de-
velop into a deduction which, over time, will severely disadvantage
working couples living in community property states. To illustrate
this, assume the following about two couples: (1) all spouses earn
approximately equal amounts; (2) no one makes any lifetime gifts;
(3) no spouse owns any separate property; (4) the husband of
each couple dies first and all property is owned jointly; (5) one
couple resides in a community property state and the other in a
common law state; and (6) the gross wealth of each couple is
$1,000,000. Table I indicates the husbands' gross and taxable es-
tates, if all their property is left to their wives.
TABLE I
Common Law Community Property
Decedent Decedent
Gross Estate $500,000 (Wife $500,000 (Husband's
legally owns the share of community
rest under property)
sections 2033
and 2040)
Marital Deduction $250,000 0
Taxable Estate $250,000 $500,000
The community property decedent's estate receives no marital
deduction because community property is removed from section
2056 (as long as the wife gets at least $250,000 of it) by sections
2056(c)(1)(C) and 2056(c)(2)(B). 12 1 By contrast, the common law
decedent may pass tax-free at least one-half of his wealth to his
wife at death, assuming no prior taxable gifts. 12 2 An unlimited
marital deduction would eliminate this serious problem.
Second, the adoption of the unlimited marital deduction
would facilitate other reforms. Congress has demonstrated politi-
cal weakness in the transfer tax area. The unlimited marital de-
duction is politically attractive because it benefits the group most
121 See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
122 I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A).
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frequently cited as deserving of transfer tax protection-
surviving, aged dependent spouses. 123  Such a change would
focus even more attention on the problem of disappearance of the
marital deduction bequest through consumption, resulting in no
transfer tax in a generation. This is only an "abuse" if the wealth
passes to younger family members. Thus, the need to modify and
rethink, as discussed above, the $3,000 annual exclusion is even
more imperative.
In endorsing an unlimited marital (and dependent child) de-
duction the Canadian Carter Commission also proposed that to
protect the integrity of the deduction against marriages entered
into for tax avoidance purposes, inter-spousal transfers would not
be tax-free until the marriage had lasted five years or a natural
child had been born.' 4 Policing the "genuineness" of marriages
seems distasteful at best; therefore, after acceptance of the unlim-
ited marital deduction, Congress should make gifts or bequests to
a surviving spouse potentially taxable as generation skipping
transfers. 125 Presently, spouses are automatically assigned to the
same generation by section 2611(c)(2). This rule could be mod-
ified to provide that a donee spouse, in line with the genera-
tion skipping system, would be deemed to be a generation
younger if he or she was more than twelve and one-half years
younger than the donor spouse. 26  The Code would levy a gen-
eration skipping tax on an outright gift to such a spouse, using
the rest of the generation skipping system. In addition, any ben-
eficiary spouse more than twelve and one-half years younger than
the creator spouse would be assigned to a generation younger for
purposes of determining whether a trust or trust equivalent is a
generation skipping trust.1 27
The adoption of an unlimited estate tax marital deduction
would require a rethinking of two statutory corollaries of the
present 50% marital deduction. The first is the gift tax marital
123 Cost has always been a major element in the opposition to an unlimited marital
deduction. Adoption of all the suggestions made here, including the generation skipping
limitation on the marital deduction, would respond to the cost argument.
124 3 ROYAL COMM'N ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON TAXATION 146
(1966).
115 "Taxable marital deduction generation skipping transfers" could be added to I.R.C.
§ 2603 as a new category of taxable transfers.
126 The 12 1/2 year rule could be softened by phasing out gradually the unlimited mari-
tal deduction as the number of years of difference increases, beginning at a certain level
such as 10 years.
127 See I.R.C. § 2611(c).
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deduction, which parallels the present estate tax rules. The first
$100,000 of interspousal gifts by a common law domiciliary are
tax free; the next $100,000 are potentially taxable and the value
of any gifts after total gifts equal $200,000 is 50% taxable.128 In
a community property state, interspousal gifts of a portion of
community property are fully taxable 129 because the creation of
community property, although in some sense a transfer, is non-
taxable. 130  The second statutory corollary is the split gift provi-
sion of the gift tax. Section 2513 treats a gift by one married per-
son to a third person, even if a gift of that spouse's separately
owned property, to be a gift to the extent of one-half of its value
made by each spouse, as long as the nonowner spouse consents to
such treatment by the signing of an appropriately filed gift tax
return.' 31 This provision equalizes gifts of noncommunity prop-
erty with gifts of community property.
The objection to a change from the rules just described to an
unlimited gift tax marital deduction are stronger than the objec-
tions to providing such a deduction at death. The essence of this
objection is the fear that a husband and wife could conspire to
reduce their transfer taxes by dividing the family wealth into two
parts and giving the parts away separately, as two different aggre-
gations of wealth. A weakness of this objection is that such
"schemes" are possible under the present system. 132  Moreover,
the prospect of marital failure is a powerful countervailing force
against abuse of an unlimited gift tax marital deduction.' 33
The adoption of an unlimited marital gift tax deduction
seems advisable. With such a change Congress could eliminate the
split gift provisions. The Service could be given special authority
to ensure that simple gift-regift schemes between spouses would
have to establish that the donee spouse's ownership, especially if
of a temporary nature, be substantial and not merely a sham to
i28 I.R.C. § 2523.
129 I.R.C. § 2523(f)(1). The $100,000 tax free, interspousal gift rule does not apply to a
community property donor because it cannot be clear before death whether the aggregate
community property on the date of the death of the first to die will exceed $200,000. This
fact would have to be known to extend the common law $100,000 tax free rule to gifts by
community property domiciliaries.
130 See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
131 I.R.C. § 2513(a)(2).
132 The split gift rule of I.R.C. § 2513 permits this directly and also by allowing an
owner spouse to hide $3,000 per donee of gifts each year by virtue of the other spouse's
consent.
133 See F. SANDER & H. GUTMAN, TAX ASPECTS OF DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1975).
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split the gift tax burden. Also, if this turned out to be a large and
uncontrollable problem, Congress could consider adopting a rule
automatically attributing a gift by a donee spouse back to the orig-
inal donor if it occured within some reasonable short period, such
as ten years.
D. Unified Credit
Liberalizing the marital deduction would permit a revision
and reduction of the $47,000 unified credit 134 which permits tax
free lifetime gifts and bequests of $175,625 worth of property in
addition to any marital deduction transfer. The credit is justified as
an administratively desirable exemption for a modest amount of
gratuitous transfers.1 35  The credit, however, offsets every tax-
payer's liability; even an extremely wealthy taxpayer may transfer
$175,625 tax free (in addition to any marital deduction transfer).
The credit, although rate bracket neutral, 136 is inconsistent
with the goal of leveling great accumulations of wealth. A unified
credit is consistent with this goal only if it is limited to smaller
estates. With large estates there is no administrative simplicity ar-
gument not to tax the first $175,625, because a return will be
filed (and reviewed) in any event. The credit should, therefore, be
recast to phase out when taxable wealth exceeds some significant
level. 137 A convenient way to do this would be to back the credit
out of the tax calculation offset provided in section 2010.138 At
the same time the amount of the credit should be reduced be-
cause there is no justification to exempt transfers of wealth of the
magnitude presently permitted.
134 I.R.C. § 2010.
'35 An alternative explanation made to the author by another tax professor is that it is
an unabashed effort by Congress to keep "modest" estates out of the transfer tax system
which should tax only the very wealthy. Any statistically honest definition of the very
wealthy begins with estates below $175,625. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
136 It is rate bracket neutral in that dollar for dollar it abates each taxpayer's liability at
his effective transfer tax rate. The old $60,000 estate exclusion reduced tax at each tax-
payer's marginal bracket and, thus, became increasingly valuable as the marginal bracket
(and size) of the estate increased.
I An obvious choice would be to phase it out beginning with taxable estates exceeding
$175,625.
138 For each dollar in the taxable estate above $175,625, 30 cents of credit could be
forfeited. Thirty cents is appropriate because the maximum estate tax bracket is 70%. A
steeper rate would make the rates at the lower end of the phasing out too suddenly pro-
gressive.
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E. More Unification
Comprehensive reform of the transfer tax system consistent
with the above noted five themes must include an attempt to
"unify" more completely the gift and estate taxes. The Code cur-
rently cumulates all taxable gifts for gift tax purposes, but cumu-
lates only post-1976 gifts for estate tax purposes.1 3 9  Congress
created this distinction because donors of pre-1977 gifts may have
"relied" in some sense on the non-cumulation of lifetime gifts into
the taxable estate.140  Such reliance does not constitutionally pro-
hibit an inclusion of all gifts into the taxable estate. 14 1 Although pure
uniformity would be furthered by an inclusion of all gifts into the
taxable estate, it is probably undesirable to change the 1976 Act's
fair-minded grandfathering of pre-1977 gifts.
One significant change made by the 1976 Act was the revi-
sion of section 2035. Section 2035 includes in the taxable estate
gifts made within three years of death without regard to whether
such gifts were made in contemplation of death.1 42  In addition,
such gifts when brought back into an estate also carry in (or are
"grossed up" to reflect) any gift tax actually paid. 143  Under the
previous non-gross-up rule a wealthy individual could reduce his
estate taxes by making deathbed gifts even though the gifts were
brought back into the estate by the contemplation rule. 144  The
new rule of section 2035(c), which includes gift taxes paid, should
apply without regard to the period of time between gift and
death. The only exception would be that pre-1977 gifts and gift
taxes would be excluded 145 on reliance grounds.
If the "gross-up" rule of section 2035 is expanded, as
suggested here, what residual purpose would section 2035 serve?
1 9 I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2502. The generation skipping tax, levied at the deemed transferor's
rates, likewise should include all prior gifts, especially in the case of a generation skipping
transfer before death. Presently, it parallels the estate tax system by only including gifts
made after December 31, 1976. I.R.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C). See notes 168-72 and accompanying
text infra.
140 This feature of the old system helped only the very rich. JOINT COMM., supra note 19,
at 526-27.
"4' The constitutional limits on a tax of the excise variety are difficult to discern, and
one commentator has concluded that the similar grandfathering of pre-1976 trusts in the
generation skipping system was not constitutionally required. R. CovEY, GENERATION SKIP-
PING TRANSFERS IN TRUST (1976). See notes 168-72 and accompanying text infra.
142 Prior to 1976, I.R.C. § 2035 only taxed transfers made in contemplation of death.
143 I.R.C. § 2035(c).
144 B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note 7, at 1126-27.
The change would actually be accomplished to include in the I.R.C. § 2001 term
"adjusted taxable gifts" the amount of any gift tax paid on such a gift.
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At present, as a corollary to including gifts made within three
years of death, section 2035 operates to bring in post-gift appreci-
ation. Thus, if property is transferred within three years of death
and the donee holds it, or clearly traceable substitute property, at
the time of the donor's death, then any appreciation or deprecia-
tion in the value of that property is reflected in the estate. 146 In
other words, section 2001 includes the property, not the gift;
therefore, such property ceases to be an adjusted taxable gift
under section 200 1.147 This attempt to "hold onto" property
seems inconsistent with true unification but it exists because of
another concern-the evasion potential in a fully unified system
which ignores gifts of rapidly appreciating property, made near
the end of the donor's life.1 48
Significant revision or abolition of sections 2036 to 2038
would be another major step towards fuller unification. These
provisions, which have never been coordinated with the gift tax,
make little sense. Two examples involving section 2036 illustrate
this. First, if a donor creates a trust with the income reserved to
himself for life, remainder to his daughter, the actuarial value of
the remainder interest is a taxable gift at the time of creation. 149
When the donor dies, section 2036 includes the entire value of
the corpus at its current value. Section 2012 provides a credit for
the prior payment of any gift taxes. Second, suppose a donor
creates a trust providing income to his son for life, corpus to his
son at age forty, and retains a power to alter the trust at any time
during his life by requiring a distribution of the corpus to his son.
The creation of such a trust is a fully taxable gift under section
2511 150 because it is a completed transfer for purposes of the gift
tax. Yet, when the donor dies, section 2038 includes the entire
value of the corpus in the donor's gross estate because his power
to accelerate is too significant. 151
Sections 2036 to 2038 served important purposes when gifts
were not cumulated into the gross estate, but now the complexity
'"6 Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1958) (not revised to reflect the 1976 changes in I.R.C.
§ 2035).
147 I.R.C. § 2001(b) excludes from the definition of "adjusted taxable gifts" those "gifts
which are [otherwise] includible in the gross estate of the decedent."
148 The major post-1976 justification for the retention of I.R.C. §§ 2035-2038 is the
possibility of including post-gift appreciation in the estate. See S. SURREY, supra note 28, at
274.
149 Treas. Reg. §§ 2 5.2511-1(e), 25.2512-5 (1958).
150 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d) (1958).
151 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958).
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and confusion surrounding these provisions is hard to defend.
They pull back into the estate the gifts (with appreciation or
depreciation).152  The theoretical justification for taxation of this
appreciation is that the donor continues to benefit from the ap-
preciation either by receiving large income payments or by retain-
ing ownership-like power over the property.
153
In 1969 the Treasury made a series of proposals designed to
achieve complete unification of the gift and estate taxes. Table II
summarizes the Treasury's proposals.
TABLE II
Gift Tax Estate Tax
Donor Retains:
(i) A primary life estate
(ii) A defeasible future
interest that does not
fall in before the
donor's death
(iii) A defeasible future
interest which falls
in before the donor's
death
(iv) A vested future
interest
(v) Retention of a limited
power of appointment
(vi) Retention of a general
power of appointment
None
Full
Fully includible
None (except in-
cludible as an
adjusted taxable gift)
Prior
interest taxable
if capable
of valuation
Full
None
Full (taxed twice;
once as an adjusted
taxable gift; once as
property includible
in estate)
Property value
less value of
prior interests in-
cludible in estate
None (except in-
cludible if an adjusted
taxable gift)
Full 154
152 See notes 147-48 and accompanying text supra.
15' The Supreme Court's decision in Byrum v. United States, 408 U.S. 125 (1972),
which threatened to limit the reach of I.R.C. § 2036, was legislatively overruled by I.R.C. §
2036(b).
'54 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, supra note 38, at 351-87.
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In the first example described above, no gift tax would be paid
and the corpus would be includible in the estate. In the second,
the creation of the trust would be a fully taxable gift and nothing
would be brought back into the estate (except as an adjusted taxa-
ble gift) at the time of the donor's death because of his power to
accelerate a distribution of the corpus.
Commentators have labelled the Treasury's proposals the
"easy-to-complete"gift approach and have criticized them for sev-
eral reasons.1 55 First, commentators claim the proposals will
permit greater "evasion" and that, if anything, the law should
make it harder to complete a gift tax transfer.156  The fear of
"evasion" referred to is a function of their belief that appreciation
in the gifted property should be taxed to a donor, who retains
significant powers. Second, they argue that the easy-to-complete
gift approach would make the income and transfer tax systems
even less compatible than at present with respect to when a donor
will be deemed to still be an owner of property.
Congress should adopt the Treasury's 1969 unification pro-
posals as a way of eliminating the confusion surrounding the con-
tinued existence of inconsistent gift and estate tax definitions of
''completion" in a new statutory mold of cumulation of all gifts
into a decedent's estate. The criticisms, described above, can be
met to a certain degree by modifying the Treasury's proposals.
For instance, the definition of a primary life estate should be ex-
panded to include a retained power to select among beneficiaries.
Such power may be held alone or in conjunction with others, even
if such other person has a substantial adverse interest. 157
F. Generation Skipping
Congress should also revise several of the rules of the gener-
ation skipping system in line with the goals described above. First,
Congress should eliminate the exclusion for each child of the
deemed transferor of the first $250,000 worth of generation skip-
ping transfers benefiting grandchildren.1 58 No valid policy sup-
ports this provision, which benefits only the well advised and
'- See S. SURREY, supra note 28, at 441-42.
156 Id.; Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977).
1,7 Congress has taken a step in this direction by including in the present statutory
definition of this idea the implied retention of power over a gift of stock in an enterprise
which the donor controls. I.R.C. § 2036(b).
158 I.R.C. § 2613(b)(6).
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wealthy trust donor. The exclusion is indefensible on administra-
tive grounds (as a small trust exemption) because small trusts ben-
efiting people other than grandchildren are not covered.
A second desirable change involves a "deeper" statutory is-
sue. The generation skipping tax works "internally." 1 59 If an in-
dividual dies after he has been the deemed transferor of a gener-
ation skipping transfer, the value of the property passed by that
transfer is not included in his estate as an adjusted taxable gift or
otherwise.1 6 0  This sound decision is based on the fact that the
deemed transferor becomes such by statutory fiat and not as a
result of any act or the accrual of any particular benefit. 161 In
spite of this, section 2601 permits the use of the value of prior or
simultaneous generation skipping transfers to be added in and,
therefore, enlarge the property base upon which a deemed trans-
feror's marital deduction is calculated. 162  This exception to the
rule of internal operation is indefensible, for all it does is arbitrar-
ily confer an increase in the otherwise allowable marital deduction
to a class of people not identifiable as deserving a larger marital
deduction.
Third, Congress should consider changing the definition of a
generation skipping trust and the generous grandfathering of all
pre-existing trusts and many wills. A basic requirement for gener-
ation skipping taxation is that property be held in a generation
skipping trust or trust equivalent. For a trust to be a generation
skipping trust, it must have beneficiaries assigned to at least two
separate generations younger than the grantor's.1 63  If a donor
creates a testamentary trust providing income to her husband 1 64
for life, remainder to her children, it is not a generation skipping
trust. The reason for this is that because the trust property was
taxed in the donor's estate or will be taxed in the husband's (if it
is a qualifying marital deduction trust over which he had a gen-
eral power of appointment), no generation skipping tax should be
imposed. The donor or the donor's spouse pays the first genera-
tion's tax and the children or the trust are not taxed again be-
cause no generation has been skipped.165
15 Stephens & Calfee, Skip to M'Lou, 32 TAx. L. REV. 443, 454-55 (1977).
160 I.R.C. § 2001.
"I1 Under the present statute, a deemed transferor need not have any interest in the
trust. I.R.C. § 2612.
162 I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5).
163 I.R.C. § 2611(b).
164 Her husband is automatically assigned to the same generation, regardless of age.
I.R.C. § 2 611(c). See notes 110-27 and accompanying text supra.
165 See Stephens & Calfee, supra note 159, at 563-64.
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The idea behind the two generation rule is that property
should be taxed at least once in every generation that benefits
from it. 166 Thus, a trust providing income to a donor's children
for life, remainder to his great-grandchildren, bears one level of
the generation skipping tax on the death of the children, even
though it skips through another generation before landing on the
great-grandchildren. The operation of the two younger genera-
tion rule makes sense in the context of the children-great-grand-
children trust. The rule makes less sense in the case of a sibling
trust. If a brother transfers property to a testamentary trust for
his sister's life with the remainder to her children, such a trust is
not a generation skipping trust. The only tax which is paid cur-
rently is the estate tax on the property in his estate which will
fund the trust. If, however, the brother left the property to his
sister outright and she then left it to her children, the Code would
have imposed two estate taxes.
This divergence of results justifies modifying the definition
of a generation skipping trust to include any trust with interest or
power holders assigned to at least two generations, only one of
which need be assigned to a generation younger than the grantor.
Such a reformulation of the rule would be consistent with the idea
which the generation skipping system was designed to fulfill.
Adoption of this change would potentially affect the common
situation in which the surviving spouse is the life tenant and the
children are the remaindermen. Under present law such a trust, if
it is of the marital deduction variety, is not taxed in the husband's
estate but is taxed in the wife's because she has a general power of
appointment over the corpus. 167 These results would remain
even with the new definition of a generation skipping trust be-
cause the wife's interest is, and would be, taxable as a complete
ownership interest without any need for taxation of a "deemed"
ownership by the generation skipping system. The more interest-
ing situation is when there is a nonmarital deduction trust, like a
family trust, in which the wife is the primary income beneficiary.
One might initially think that under the definition of a generation
skipping trust, proposed above, such a trust should be deemed to
be a generation skipping trust. If so, then two taxes would be
paid: (1) the husband's gift or estate tax at the time of the crea-
tion of the family trust, and (2) the generation skipping tax on the
166 See JOINT CoIm., supra note 19, at 572-73.
167 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5).
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death of the wife. This initial reaction fails to take into account
that the family trust, unlike the sibling trust, involves the marital
deduction rules.
The issue of whether to except from the proposed new def-
inition of a generation skipping trust nonmarital deduction family
trusts in which the wife is the life tenant and the children are the
remaindermen is complex. At present, property placed in such a
trust is taxable in the husband's estate and upon the death of the
wife will not be taxable as a generation skipping trust, as long
as only the children have interests in the trust. If the new definition
of a generation skipping trust were adopted, then the latter event
would be potentially a taxable generation skipping transfer. The
only reason not to include such trusts is that inclusion might seem
inconsistent with another proposal advanced here-the unlimited
marital deduction. Viewed from the perspective of an unlimited
marital deduction, the application of the new definition of a gen-
eration skipping trust would in the family context seem to tax
twice what is ordinarily taxed only once. This appearance is incor-
rect; the new definition should apply to family trusts as well. The
reason for this is that the family trust does not, by definition,
come within the marital deduction, whether it be a 50% or an
unlimited marital deduction, and, therefore, the logic of the
proposed new definition of a generation skipping trust extends to
these family trusts with equal force.
The final significant change which Congress should make is
to apply the generation-skipping rules to pre-1976 trusts and
wills.1 68  Irrevocable trusts executed before June 11, 1976, and
wills or revocable trusts in existence on June 11, 1976, of dece-
dents dying before January 1, 1982, are exempted from the sys-
tem. 16 ') This exemption is justified on the same grounds as the
failure to add pre-1977 gifts into the taxable estate. 17 0 There is a
major difference between the two provisions, which should lead
Congress to eliminate this exception. Pre-1977 gifts were made in
a cumulative gift tax system that eschewed cumulation into the
estate. Taxpayers did make taxable gifts in particular reliance on
that statutory choice.1 71  The generation skipping system is en-
tirely new, so no specific reliance can be demonstrated. Perhaps
168 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006(a)(c), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) as amended by Pub. L. No.
95-600, § 702(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
169 Id.
'71 See Stephens & Calfee, supra note 159, at 609.
71 See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
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it can be said that people relied on the fact that trusts could skip
through generations but this reliance interest is remote.
Moreover, the tax burden falls on the trust, not the estate of the
decedent who made the gifts, 172 like a pure excise which should
be applied to everyone.
V
MORE RADICAL APPROACHES
In 1977 Professor George Cooper of Columbia Law School
attacked the post-1976 transfer tax system as ineffective. 173 Pro-
fessor Cooper pointed to certain exotic techniques-preferred
stock recapitalizations and charitable lead trusts-which permit
elimination or reduction in an individual's transfer tax burden.
He also showed how certain provisions, such as the survivor an-
nuity exclusion, countenance total tax exemption for certain types
of wealth. Professor Cooper then attempted to formulate propos-
als to close these loopholes but rejected his own proposals because
he decided that the system could not be improved by piecemeal
reforms and concluded by suggesting that a wealth tax would be a
desirable alternative.
More recently, Professor Gilbert Verbit of Boston University,
after studying 174 the major western European wealth tax propos-
als, endorsed the Progressive Annual Wealth Accessions Tax
(PAWAT) system. 175 PAWAT combines features of a transfer
tax, an accessions tax, and a wealth tax. Tax payments are made
as transfers are received 176 but are calculated on the basis of what
the present value of annual wealth tax payments would be for the
particular donee of the particular gift.1 77 The PAWAT computa-
tion projects the wealth tax payments to age eighty-five and, thus,
if a donee gives away the gifted property before he attains age
eighty-five he gets a rebate of the payments he is deemed to have
paid 178 on account of the years, if any, remaining to age eighty-
172 I.R.C. § 2603.
173 Cooper, supra note 156.
174 Verbit, Taxing Wealth: Recent Proposals from the United States, France and the United
Kingdom, 60 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1980).
175 Id. at 45. The PAWAT was endorsed by the Meade Commission Study in England.
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, REPORT OF A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY PROF. J.E. MEADE,
THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION 516 (1978).
176 INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, supra note 175, at 321.
177 Id. at 322-23.
178 Id. at 321.
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five from the year of regift. A gift of saved property does not
generate a rebate.
The Cooper and Verbit proposals may well represent desira-
ble, more fundamental approaches to transfer tax reform. This
Article does not purport to suggest that a patch-up of the present
system is inherently preferable to a wealth tax or a PAWAT. This
Article does assume, however, that the events of 1976 make it
unlikely that Congress will lurch out in a fundamentally new di-
rection in this area. Three years have passed since the Cooper
article appeared, and apart from significant academic discussion it
has failed to generate interest. 17 1'
The proposals made here and justified by Congress's retreat
on carryover basis are consistent both with the 1976 Act and with
the continued development of the unique American transfer tax
system. Many of the "abuses" Professor Cooper fixes on-the
charitable lead trust and the section 2039(c) exclusion -should be
eliminated. With respect to some of the other "abuses" genuine
questions can be asked about whether they are likely to be
employed and, if so, whether the tax and other risks a donor un-
dertakes in employing them are so significant that rather than
being abuses they are legitimate transactions entitled to their pre-
sent treatment. Adoption of the proposals made here would go a
long way to making the American transfer tax system at least a
credible alternative to Professor Cooper's wealth tax or Professor
Verbit's PAWAT system.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues for continuing reformation of the trans-
fer tax system along the broad outlines endorsed by the 1976 Act
by reference to the repeal in.1980 of the rule of carryover basis.
One objection to the line of argument made here for a tactical
acceptance of the return to a bifurcated income tax rule is that
the success of the reform proposals in tightening up the transfer
tax system would focus even greater attention on the income tax
inconsistency between inter-vivos and testamentary transfers. If
the transfer tax becomes more effective in taxing wealth, then
marginal considerations, like the continuing advantage created by
section 1014, will become even more significant in tax planning.
17 Professor Cooper endorsed the wealth tax approach in greater detail in a relaxed
Mortimer Hess Memorial Lecture before the House of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York on May 22, 1978. See Cooper, Taking Wealth Taxation Seriously, 34 THE
RECORD 24 (1979).
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This possible objection to the proposals and the approach of
this Article can be answered in several ways. First, most individu-
als are reluctant to make lifetime gifts. Before 1976 Congress
explicitly encouraged lifetime gifts by setting the gift tax rates at
three-quarters of the estate tax rates. In addition, gifts and gift
taxes were not included in the estate. Even with these substantial
incentives the amount of reported taxable lifetime gifts was
small.' 80 Although these tax benefits do play a role in planning
decisions, it is fairly clear that taxpayers resist lifetime giving.
Consequently, the difference between sections 1014 and 1015 may
not have as much an incentive effect as is supposed: people wish to
hold property until death in any event. Second, section 1015 may
well be the anomaly, not section 1014. If so, prevention of tax
avoidance in the context of inter-vivos family transfers of appreci-
ated property, not congressionally sanctioned income tax policy,
justifies its special rule. Third, the extra "cost" associated with
lifetime giving (a carryover basis) may act to counterbalance the
advantage of removing possible further appreciation and the gift
taxes paid from the donor's estate. Significantly, taxpayers are un-
likely to sell quickly the kinds of assets which Professor Cooper
mentions in his article as used to secure this advantage, e.g.,
closely held stock. When sold, these assets carry an income tax
"bite" which seems altogether fitting. Finally, the fact that Con-
gress has found it impossible to stick with the decision embodied
in now-repealed section 1023 should not be a justification to pre-
vent further reform of the transfer tax system. To the extent that
such reform focuses more attention on the income tax inconsis-
tency between sections 1014 and 1015 and forces Congress to re-
consider it, then anyone interested in a consistent, effective tax
system should be pleased.
.80 Cooper, supra note 156, at 170-87.
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